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ABSTRACT 
Ways of re-thinking problems and doing research on organizing are suggested by the post-structuralist insight that existing discourses 
simultaneously circumscribe what we do and say, and provide contradictions which disrupt dominant ways of doing and speaking. 
This article examines some data collected by the author with women organizers in an attempt to demonstrate some moments where 
such circumscription and disruption occur. 
RESUME 
De nouvelles facons de traiter des problemes et de faire des recherches sur l'organisation sont suggerees par la perspicacity post-
stucturaliste qui dit que des discours contemporains circonscrivent ce que nous faisons et ce que nous disons, et creent des 
contradictions qui remettent en question les facons d'agir et de parler dominantes. Cet article etudie quelques donnees ramassees par 
I'auteure et par des organisatrices dans le but de ddmontrer certains moments ou on retrouve ce genre de circonscription et de remise 
en question. 
A popular form o f feminist research asks 
women to speak the "truth" about their lives; 
s imilar ly, many o f us have set out to write "the 
truth" about "our own experiences." This work has 
made an important intervention in the long 
invisibil i ty o f women. A t the same time, however, 
the notion o f "experience" as the basis o f 
knowledge tends to ignore how experience is 
situated in and organized by the social order in 
which we live. This social order includes the 
organization o f language, which constitutes the 
limits o f possibility for understanding, expressing, 
and indeed "experiencing" our experience (Gore, 
1992: 37; Scott, 1992). 
The most common—and commonly 
unquestioned—theories about language, discourse 
and subjectivity derive from liberal-humanism. In 
this paper, I want to revisit some data I collected in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s with women 
organizers, in the light o f poststructuralist 
theorizing. I give some examples of how the 
liberal-humanist mindset can limit and distort the 
ways feminists think about "the human," as wel l as 
our efforts to organize and to reflect on the process 
of that organizing. 
M u c h has been written about feminist 
organizing practices (Adamson, Briskin & McPhai l , 
1988; Wine & Ristock, 1991; also selections from 
Carrol l , 1992; Cunningham et al, 1988; N g , 
Walker, Mul ler , 1990). This literature argues that 
ideology and power operate through traditional 
forms o f organization (Leidner, 1991), an insight 
which has guided feminist organizing since the 
beginning o f the second wave o f feminism. 
Thinking through the implications o f alternative 
methods, however, requires a clear sense o f how 
practices o f ruling and o f patriarchy are 
perpetuated. This in turn necessitates, among other 
things, challenging the underlying structures o f 
language and notions of subjectivity which sustain 
both hierarchical and collective organizational 
forms. Thus post-structuralist theory calls for a 
self-critique o f feminist practices and discourses, 
looking, as Jennifer Gore says, "for their dangers, 
their normalizing tendencies, for how they might 
serve as instruments o f domination despite the 
intentions o f their creators" (1992: 54). 
Before proceeding with an analysis o f 
some o f the data I have collected about women's 
organizing, I want to clarify how I am using the 
terms post-structuralism and liberal-humanism in 
this context. From a liberal-humanist perspective, 
writing and speaking tend to be seen as a means o f 
transmitting the intention o f an author directly to 
the listener or reader. Language is seen as a 
medium, naming a wor ld which exists 
independently o f it; speaker/writer and 
listener/reader share a relatively unproblematic 
understanding o f the meaning being conveyed. 
Post-structuralism begins from the perspective that 
it is language which makes meaning possible, that 
words do not name pre-existing differences but 
inform us about what differences are visible and 
matter in any given situation. While it is never 
immutable, language provides a set o f preexisting 
structures which have always already framed and 
organized our wor ld and its meanings (Belsey, 
1980; Weedon, 1987). When we speak or write, 
then, we draw on the particular domain of language 
use — what post-structuralists call a "discourse"--
that seems most appropriate for the topic or 
audience we have in mind. This discourse then 
provides the limits o f what we can think or say. 
Thus, dominant ways o f reading, writing and 
speaking are ideological inasmuch as they enable 
the practices o f power which mark late twentieth 
century western societies. 
Similarly, subjectivity or identity is much 
more complex than allowed for by 
liberal-humanism. "Humanism posits the subject as 
an autonomous individual capable of full 
consciousness and endowed with a stable "self..." 
(Lather, 1991: 5). Post-structuralists argue that 
humanism requires us to imagine ourself thus; as I 
have argued elsewhere, definitions o f normality 
have taught many o f us that we must construct a 
rational, coherent story from the pieces of our lives, 
a story which leaves little or no space for 
fragmentation, desire, uncertainty and confusion 
(Heald, 1991: 138-39). 
A liberal-humanist understanding of 
language and subjectivity limits ways o f describing 
—orally or in writing—feminist organizing to what 
Belsey (1980) calls "expressive realism" and others 
refer to simply as "realism". Realism assumes 2 that 
words or pictures can stand in for a thing itself, to 
the extent that we can cla im to "know" something 
from having seen the picture (Christian, Hansen, 
Needham, 1989: 76). Examples o f realist 
representations which have been popularized 
enough to be well-known to those who want to talk 
or write about organizing are ethnography and 
autobiography. Post-structuralist theorizing argues 
that autobiography and ethnography constitute 
discourses which provide instructions about how to 
tell stories about organizing. However, women's 
entry into conflicting discourses opens up 
possibilities for recognizing and resisting this 
overdetermination. I argue that the crisis in 
representation cannot be solved either by saying 
that women's voices are capturable and always true, 
or by saying that women's voices are ever and 
always trapped within discursive structures that tell 
us what and how to think about our lives, though 
there is some truth in both. Thus we need to 
re-examine the stories o f others, which researchers 
often collect as "data," to see how and i f such 
stories reflect simplistic notions o f coherent selves 
and transparent language. 
A t the same time, recent work in 
anthropology and literary criticism is actively 
critiquing liberal humanist notions of language, 
meaning and subjectivity and proposing methods 
for telling stories—of ourselves or others—which 
challenge the traditions o f realism (Abu-Lughod, 
1993; Atkinson, 1990; Behar & Gordon, 1995; 
Benstock, 1988; Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Cole & 
Phil l ips, 1995; Gonick, 1996; Okely & Callaway, 
1992; Personal Narratives Group, 1989; Smith, 
1987, 1993; Thomas, 1991; Tsing, 1993; Wi l son , 
1982). While these critiques unsettle 
taken-for-granted assumptions about what it means 
to write or speak about a " s e l f or a "culture" (in 
this case, an organization), they are not well-known 
amongst women organizers who face the task o f 
setting their story to paper or tape. Thus we often 
describe ourselves using conventional forms: 
A text which uses conventional forms in a 
conventional way is territorialized, it 
embodies the majority discourse and 
reflects the obtaining ideology o f the 
society from which it springs. This is the 
case with most forms o f popular narrative 
even though they may reflect that 
ideology from an oppositional standpoint 
(Maclean, 1988: 45). 
Argu ing that ethnography is allegorical 
(i.e., "stories simultaneously describe real cultural 
events and make additional, moral, ideological, and 
even cosmological statements"), James Clifford 
(1986: 98, 101) says that such "allegories stand 
behind the controlled fictions o f difference and 
similitude that we call ethnographic accounts." 
These allegories have the effect o f narrowing the 
possible ways we can talk about and understand our 
organizing practices. Similarly, in autobiography: 
...the very forms and language o f cultural 
stories o f selfhood are "populated — 
overpopulated — with theintentions o f 
others" in the sense that they carry in them 
those cultural expectations and systems o f 
intepretation through which a culture 
makes palpable its effort to understand 
and makes durable its power to name the 
world, itself, and others. (Smith, 1987: 48; 
quoting Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination) 
This means then, that, in order to develop 
and express practices o f organizing which are 
fundamentally different, which interrupt and/or 
make visible currently dominant practices, we have 
to think not only about organizing in a new way, 
but "about language and about meaning, about the 
relationships between meaning and the world, 
meaning and people, and finally about people 
themselves and their place in the world" (Belsey, 
1980: 4). A s Bronwyn Davies explains it: 
...the means for moving beyond the old 
ways o f thinking and speaking...lie 
with...an analysis both o f how existing 
discursive practices trap us into the worlds 
we are trying to move beyond, and with 
the collective development o f discursive 
practices that bring into being those new, 
almost unimaginable possibilities that are 
being opened up by the current generation 
o f feminists. Fundamental to this idea is 
an understanding o f the person as in 
process, and of words coming not from an 
essential core o f the person but from the 
discursive practices through which the 
person is constituting themselves and 
being constituted (1990: 520). 
What the fol lowing reexamination o f my 
data suggests, then, is that stories women tell about 
their organizing practices, and the ways researchers 
analyse these stories, participate both in the traps o f 
dominant theories and in the possibilities o f 
feminisms. 
S O M E R E S E A R C H 
I now turn to my data, in which I think it is possible 
to see some o f the tensions caused by liberal 
humanism and the promises o f post-structural 
theories o f language and subjectivity. The data to 
which I w i l l refer here come from two separate 
pieces of research: interviews with women who 
work in four different cultural organizations in 
northwestern Ontario, only one o f which identifies 
itself as a feminist organization, though the 
individual women would by and large identify 
themselves as s u c h ; 3 and interviews with feminist 
organizers working in the area o f violence against 
women in several different groups in southwestern 
Ontario . 4 For the sake of brevity, I refer to the first 
group as "cultural organizers" and the second group 
as "feminist organizers," while recognizing both 
that these terms are sometimes overlapping, and 
that I am not assuming that all "cultural" or 
"feminist" organizers are included here. The 
women interviewed would by and large identify as 
white, though they differ in terms o f ethnicity, 
education, sexual orientation, class and polit ical 
orientation. 
I N T E R P R E T I N G " D A T A " A N D T E L L I N G 
T H E " T R U T H " 
Even when women speak using dominant 
discourses, it cannot be assumed that they are 
locked into them. It is possible that women being 
interviewed think that this is what is wanted o f 
them. This was made clear to me in an interview 
with a cultural worker during a discussion about the 
meaning o f art. I asked whether community 
creations could be art, and the woman I was 
interviewing said: 
No . Because art has to be a concept by an 
individual artist, not a collective concept 
by a community group. That's the one 
fundamental distinction. 
- -Do you agree with that? 
[incredulous] 
N o , that's the funding distinction. 
- Y e a h , O K . 
Yeah, so...I guess i f you're asking . . .Yeah, 
I'm not quite sure o f the question. 
- N o , that's O K . It's just that you 
said that with such confidence. 
I'm saying that by rote; it's been drummed 
into me at every meeting. 
I had not intended to make the woman feel 
confused. Without my knowledge o f her from our 
history together I suspect I would have accepted 
what she was saying at face value. B y questioning 
her, I came to see that in this instance—and perhaps 
countless others in this and other interviews—it was 
possible to speak the discourse and yet "know" 
something entirely different. Perhaps we were both 
using what Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing refers to as the 
"guerilla tactics o f multiple, uneasily jostling 
theories and stories [which] can at least disrupt the 
smug assumptions o f comfortably settled 
monologics"(1993: 32-33). 
Perhaps, too, I catch myself here in a 
moment o f assuming not only that the woman I was 
interviewing would be invested in presenting 
herself as a liberal-humanist subject, but that she 
was one, that she was the author o f her words. A s 
Gon ick explains this problem, "...stories o f 
individuals can...be read as i f their experiences 
were transparent concomitants o f the social 
category stressed in the account, thus reconfirming 
unself-conscious assumptions about those 
categories instead o f leading to a consideration of 
how those categories were constructed" (1996: 9; 
Gonick is here drawing on Scott, 1992). This, then, 
is one example o f how the dominance of the theory 
o f the liberal-humanist subject can cause problems 
for feminist researchers. 
W O R K I N G A L I T T L E H A R D E R 
In the second example from my data, I 
want to show how the notion o f the 
liberal-humanist subject created problems for the 
women organizers I was interviewing. Al though 
women in the feminist organizations tended to 
indicate that they paid more attention to looking 
after themselves, to working in a way which took 
into consideration women's differing life situations, 
in both groups women felt that the work required 
more o f their lives than would be the case with 
other kinds o f work. The extraordinary efforts 
which are required of community organizers are not 
only to ensure our personal livelihoods; the notion 
of responsibility for supporting the organization, its 
purposes and its personnel, loomed large in the 
understanding many of the women I interviewed 
had o f their work. Such responsibility can be 
liberating, because women have opportunities to do 
things that they would never be given the 
opportunity to do in patriarchal organizations, but 
there is also a burdensome end o f responsibility: 
With me, I always thought, "If I work just 
a little bit harder, i f I do this, i f I do that, 
then it's going to work, everything's going 
to succeed," but obviously that's just not 
true. 
"I f only I work a little harder"~this is a 
common theme for women working in small 
alternative and feminist organizations. It helps to 
keep in place the liberal-humanist subject in control 
o f her world, responsible for the success or failure 
of al l her endeavours. Whi le there is something 
positive about this image, since women have not 
been seen to have this k ind o f control, it is a 
dangerous fiction as well : women blame themselves 
—and each other-for failure. We often interpret 
issues o f politics as issues of personality, and, 
mired in issues of process, we complain that we are 
not doing what we might in terms o f the initial 
purposes o f our organization, because the 
individuals involved "just can't do it right and get 
on with it." Perhaps the problem is neither with the 
process nor the individuals, but with the theory of 
the individual subject assumed by our ideas about 
"good process." 
The liberal-humanist subject understands 
the resolution of conflicts to be within her power: 
" i f only I work just a little bit harder." O r better, or 
smarter, or i f I were just a better feminist. Here we 
can see feminist ideology playing a role in 
circumscribing feminist organizing practices 
because certain feelings or experiences are 
contained within the notion of "not feminist 
enough." 
In part, feminism accomplishes this the 
same way other discursive practices do, by 
authorizing certain subject positions/ identities, and 
disenfranchising others. A s many women have 
pointed out, feminism has privileged the notion o f 
a singular identity "woman," claiming that unity is 
necessary in order to provide protection against "the 
other" (cf, Mohanty, 1991; Ri ley , 1988; Spelman, 
1988). These practices obscure issues of power. 
United against a common enemy, the only 
differences which can be recognized are those 
between "them" (men) and "us" (women), thus 
obscuring other differences, for example, race, 
class, sexual orientation and physical ability. Biddy 
Mar t in and Chandra Talpade Mohanty show that: 
When one conceives of power differently, 
in terms o f its local, institutional, 
discursive formations, o f its positivity, and 
in terms o f the production rather than 
suppression of forces, then unity is 
exposed to be a potentially repressive 
fiction. It is at the moment at which 
groups and individuals are conceived as 
agents, as social actors, as desiring 
subjects that unity, in the sense of 
coherent group identity, commonality, and 
shared experience, becomes difficult. 
Individuals do not fit neatly into 
unidimensional, self-identical categories 
(1986: 204-205). 
Clearly, to have successful organizations, 
we need a different understanding o f what it means 
to have differences, a different conception of power 
and a new sense o f "community;" I am suggesting 
we also need a different understanding of what it 
means to be a human subject. 
The organizer I quoted earlier ended her 
thought about working a little harder with 
"obviously that's just not true." A s obvious as it 
might be, it did not appear so at the time. The 
theory o f the subject over-rides what is "obvious", 
and leaves many organizers overburdened by the 
idea that they need "only work a little harder." 
G E T T I N G I N V O L V E D 
Women have spoken out, have given 
testimony as i f the "truth" o f their 
experiences were transparent and 
straightforward. But--is it? (Wilson, 1982: 
153) 
M u c h o f the burgeoning interest in 
autobiography, particularly women's autobiography 
(e.g. Benstock, 1988; Okley and Callaway, 1992; 
Personal Narratives Group, 1989; Smith, 1987, 
1993) has come from feminists wanting to question 
"that disengaged, self-critical, self-distanced, and 
self-scrutinizing brand o f autobiography we have 
been taught to read and critics have come to expect" 
(Kolodny, 1980: 241). This k ind o f autobiography 
would appear to be possible only for people capable 
of imagining themselves to be the liberal-humanist 
subject, an individual whose coherence is assumed. 
Faye Ginsburg, in her study o f abortion 
activists, both pro-choice and pro-life, shows how 
they construct a life story in which their activism is 
a logical outcome o f their life experiences. 
Ginsburg (1989: 65) claims that these tales 
represent a "counter-discourse," inasmuch as they 
have "the capacity to situate: to relativize the 
authority and stability o f a dominant system" 
(Terdiman, quoted in Ginsburg, 1989: 65). To that 
extent, I would agree that they can be seen to be a 
challenge to what Okley calls the "Great White 
M a n tradition," in which "the lone achiever has felt 
compelled to construct and represent his 
uniqueness, seemingly in defiance o f historical 
conditions, but actually in tune with the dominant 
power structure which have rewarded him." On the 
other hand, they do not challenge the 
liberal-humanist view of the rational, self-directing 
individual. According to Sidonie Smith: 
A s she examines her unique life and then 
attempts to constitute herself discursively 
as female subject, the autobiographer 
brings to the recollection o f her past and 
to the reflection on her identity 
interpretative figures...Those figures are 
always cast in language and are always 
motivated by cultural expectations, habits, 
and systems o f interpretation pressing on 
her at the scene of writing. Cultural scripts 
o f s ignificat ion, the figures o f 
verisimilitude and lifelikeness reflect 
privileged stories and character types that 
the prevail ing culture, through its 
discourse, names as "real" and therefore 
"readable" (1987: 47). 
A s part o f taking into consideration the 
constructedness o f the world , the contingency o f 
knowing , and the place o f the irrational and 
unconscious in our knowledge, it is important to 
recognize that the forms in which we can tell "our 
story" have already been severely circumscribed, 
both by the traditions o f autobiographical "telling," 
and by the claims that expressive realism exerts on 
our reading and writ ing and hence thinking and 
talking. A s such, the life stories Ginsburg created 
with abortion activists participate in supporting, 
rather than challenging, the dominant order. They 
appear to have participated in autobiography's 
"discursive arena in which individuals worked to 
coordinate the colorfulness o f their specific 
experiences with the bland neutrality o f a universal 
selfhood. In effect traditional autobiography 
became a way o f accomodating and containing 
colorfulness." (Smith, 1993: 19) We need to ask, 
then: H o w does our experience come to be known, 
even to ourselves? If language is not transparent, i f 
identity is not coherent, and i f understanding our 
experience in these ways is an ideological practice 
accomplished at some cost, how can we experience 
—and then tel l~our lives differently? A partial 
answer lies in the contradictoriness o f the subject 
positions dominant discourses make available for 
women. In this third example from the data, cracks 
can be seen in the hegemony o f the theory o f the 
liberal-humanist subject. 
In answering questions about how they got 
involved with the organizations a few o f the 
feminist organizers explained their involvement as 
a conscious result o f their feminism: 
When I take a look at the work that I have 
done, it has meant dedicating my life, in a 
sense, in terms of my career to working for 
the betterment o f women, and that is 
something that I do consciously, because 
I am a woman, because I am a feminist, 
because o f my awareness that although it 
is difficult work, I cannot imagine mysel f 
doing work that does not involve making 
a difference, or making a change in what 
is presently. 
I think all o f the work that I've chosen to 
do, I've chosen it because it's got some 
form of a feminist context in it. I'm really 
careful about where I want to work 
because where I work says who I am and 
this to me says who I am because I've 
chosen to work in a place like this. 
The cultural organizers in my study generally d id 
not see their decisions as quite so deliberate. They 
also did not portray themselves as somehow 
"gifted" or "creative," doing this work because they 
were "artists," or even because they felt that art was 
important. In fact, in both groups the majority 
explained their involvement as at least partially the 
result o f some kind of relationship, often with a 
man: 
D was a really good friend, and he 
approached me the first year to be a stage 
manager, and I'd never done anything like 
that before but he knew me through the 
family and thought that I could do it, and 
I really enjoyed it. 
M y older brother is a director now, a 
theatre director, and when I was about 13, 
he being in high school, he just k ind o f 
dragged me along. I did costumes, and 
helped paint sets and I caught the bug. 
I had a chance to get married and I was 
quite worried about getting married, I 
thought it was a fairly dangerous thing to 
do and I was moving to [a different town] 
in order to be with my husband. I wasn't 
moving to a job, I wasn't doing anything 
except pursuing that relationship and it 
seemed really...not al l that safe. So I 
decided to pul l around me a group o f 
supportive women and I joined [the 
organization]. 
A common explanation had to do with meeting 
others who were involved, l ik ing what they saw, 
and deciding to j o i n in: 
I started working in a whole foods 
business and a woman came to work with 
us—it was a cooperative—as a bookkeeper 
and she was a lesbian-feminist and she 
had many friends who were as wel l and I 
think it was through becoming aware o f 
that group of women and what they were 
doing that I started to do things. 
I answered an ad in the paper. A t that point 
in my life—three years ago—...my children 
were all in school full time...[and] I 
wanted to do two things: I wanted to earn 
a little bit o f money because I'd always 
done it on a voluntary basis before and 
more primarily I felt that it was a time in 
my life where I get to do something that 
gave me something. 
Often there was also the factor o f "being asked," o f 
discovering that a job needed to be done and feeling 
they could perhaps be the one to do it: 
I think I was asked to run for the board but 
I knew a lot o f those people and vaguely 
about [the organization]. I don't remember 
who asked me, but I thought, yeah, that's 
probably something I'd like to do~I was 
involved in the community anyway; and I 
also thought that what they were doing 
was valid and valuable. 
...partially because I was asked, I don't 
know i f I would have thought o f it on my 
own. I've never thought o f myself as 
having artistic skills...I've always thought 
o f myself as a worker rather than a 
creator. So I thought it was something I 
would enjoy, I was intrigued... 
Sometimes, the combination o f events, 
relationships and motivations that leads to a 
woman's involvement seems completely accidental: 
One o f the women I was working with 
came to me because her husband had just 
beat her up, and I had just been to a 
community forum where people were 
talking about different community 
agencies, and [this organization] was only 
6 months old, and the executive director 
stood up and said, just wanted to let 
people know that we are doing wel l , but 
we need volunteers, and so it twigged, and 
so I called [the organization] to help [my 
friend], and then I became a volunteer, 
and became a Board member, and became 
apart-time staff member, and gradually a 
full-time staff member. 
One woman described the story o f her 
initial involvement with one o f the cultural 
organizations as "horrible," a story she said she did 
not often tell: She was at a party and they were 
looking for someone to do a job, and she thought: 
"I could do that." This is, apparently, only 
embarrassing in the light o f a discourse which 
claims that work is found as the result o f travel 
along a clearly-defined "career path," where 
decisions are rational, and where the worthy 
succeed. A s this is the dominant story o f work 
l ives-one represented for the most part by the 
life-stories or the activists Ginsburg interviewed—it 
would be easy to expect the organizers I 
interviewed to interpret events in such a way as to 
produce such a story themselves. B y not storying 
their lives in this way, these women produce an 
implicit challenge to liberal-humanism. In part, I 
suggest, they could do this because discourses o f 
femininity make a space for women to explain our 
behaviour in terms o f relationships and caring. I am 
not trying to suggest that femininity has served 
some women well while feminism has served others 
badly. Rather, I am suggesting that we attend to the 
ways contradictory discourses make conflicting 
subject positions for women, and leave us able to 
challenge, rather than try to produce, stories that 
present us as the kind o f subject liberal-humanism 
assumes us to be. 
C A T C H I N G M Y S E L F IN T H E A C T (AGAIN) 
M u c h to my chagrin, as I re-listen to the 
tapes o f the interviews I conducted, I hear myself 
reinforcing the liberal-humanist theory o f the 
subject, not only by asking women to make a story 
o f their involvement, but also by regularly pushing 
for answers to rather hypothetical questions—would 
you have preferred to do this or that? One woman 
challenged me on this; "I don't know. You're asking 
me all these hypothetical questions, Susan, and I 
don't know. Sort of, what happened, happened." 
Whi l e at one level, I want to argue that 
"what happened" did not just "happen", at another 
level I need to realize that my questions were an 
attempt to impose coherence, to encourage people 
to make a recognizable narrative for and with me. 
W h y d id I ask these questions, in spite o f the fact 
that I was not sure I could answer them for myself? 
Partly because I always assumed I was the only one 
who d id not have a "five-year plan," whose work 
life was more accidental — whimsical ~ than 
organized and deliberate. Aga in and again in the 
interviews I noticed the falling-into-ness o f life. 
A g a i n and again I had brought home to me the 
failure o f the perception that people have a fixed set 
o f plans and goals for their lives and the reality 
that—for women and probably for men too—life is 
about flowing with the circumstances. 5 What would 
a narrative about a social movement look like i f it 
took these things into account? A t one level we 
know that relationships and chance have an 
enormous influence on what gets done and said in 
organizing, but we write these things out o f our 
accounts in our attempts to make our stories, and 
our selves, rational and coherent. A s researchers, 
we need to find ways to recognize, even encourage 
stories which express multiple, even contradictory, 
realities, using, for example, what Tsing describes 
as "strategies] in which curiosity is not 
overwhelmed by coherence" (1993: 32-33). 
W H O A R E W E , T H E N , A N D W H A T 
S H O U L D W E DO? 
Women who work in small, feminist and 
alternative organizations are not the rational, 
coherent subjects o f liberal humanism. We are 
constituted in language and discourses which are 
multiple, complex, interwoven and never static. The 
project o f having to appear to be the subject 
ideology tells us we are contributes to the failure o f 
"alternative" organizational forms and to the 
continued dominance o f conventional, patriarchal 
forms. I f this is true, then we need to open up a 
space for different kinds o f stories to be told. To 
begin with, research which aims to understand 
"experience" could recognize that "experience" is 
always-already interpreted, and made into an 
account that its teller has learned should be 
coherent, chronological, consistent. Without these 
qualities, stories would be considered untrue, or, 
simply, badly told. 
But stories badly told are often what is 
needed. If the researcher is to take account o f the 
fragmentary nature o f the subject, then at the same 
time as she restores women to their proper place as 
"knowers," she has to question how it is that we 
know anything at a l l . To the traditional 
methodological problems o f how to ensure that 
respondents tell "the truth" we have to add the 
questions of why they should, or i f they could. We 
need to try to understand something about the 
selective processes of memory. A n d so, the "truth" 
about the answers we w i l l get and the people who 
w i l l give them is that there is no one truth, although 
people may try to make one. They w i l l try to make 
one because o f the deeply embedded claims that the 
liberal-humanist theory o f the subject, manifested 
in story-telling practices like ethnography and 
autobiography, makes on our definition o f 
knowledge and "truth." 
Storytelling may indeed be universal, but 
formal narratives of the sort to be found in 
the novel or the history are certainly not, 
requiring as they do a certain notion o f 
time, o f mind, and o f power to produce 
that vision o f human reality which a 
certain culture finds plausible at a certain 
time. I f narrative is the reflection par 
excellence o f the Western mentality in its 
broadest sense, it is because of its 
perceived formal truthfulness, the implicit 
feeling that we experience the world in the 
same form as we report those experiences, 
as stories. Thus, although narrative may at 
any moment be an invitation to falsehood, 
it remains the dominant mode o f truth 
about human affairs, the "natural" form of 
mimesis (Kellner, 1989: 102-103). 
I do not want to be misunderstood here. Feminist 
organizing is hard and important work, and telling 
stories about how we have tried to fight the 
economic and social circumstances which grow out 
o f the sexist, heterosexist, racist, able-ist, classist, 
etc. practices o f our culture is an important project. 
But, rather than seeing research with and writing 
by organizers as an opportunity for "authentic" 
expression by an individual or group who stands 
outside o f the dominant social forms, we need to try 
to see how we are formed by and within the social 
formation, to understand how larger understandings 
o f truth, o f importance, o f relevance, o f how to 
speak and how to write influence the story which an 
organizer "chooses" to tell. I do not mean to suggest 
that there is an obvious "solution" to the problems 
I am trying to raise. A n y social/political practice 
faces questions of how much to participate and how 
much to challenge; what lines to toe in order to 
make what points. Many feminists find their days 
so ful l o f the constant and very real demands o f 
immediate pressing problems that there is no 
energy left to think about interrupting the ways they 
are understood or thought about. We need to work 
in solidarity to find ways to change not only the 
evident material conditions o f our oppression 
(experiencing violence, not having control over 
reproduction, etc), but also those which are buried 
within the dominant forms of meaning-making 
(here autobiography, ethnography) and their 
essential tool — language itself. 
Feminists are not unfamiliar with the idea 
o f engaging a doubled strategy "of both rendering 
problematic and provisional our most firmly held 
assumptions and, nevertheless, acting in the world, 
taking a stand" (Lather, 1991:29). Further, both our 
organizing and its representation share with many 
other attempts to challenge dominant practices the 
need to walk a fine line between radicalism and 
recuperation. Many an action falls into the trap 
noted by Susan W i l l i s : "Either it is so different 
from dominant culture as to have no impact on the 
rest o f society, or it includes points o f attraction for 
capitalism, in which case it is readily co-opted and 
assimilated" (1991: 34). What I want to do, then, is 
to critique the tendency towards assuming that our 
words and meanings are transparent when we write, 
talk about or research organizing, exploring where 
we might go i f we stopped making these 
assumptions while at the same time recognizing that 
we must continue to organize, to organize 
differently, and to extend what we learn through 
this into the public domain by writ ing and talking. 
Polkinghorne (1988:183) argues that 
narrative attends to the temporal dimension o f the 
theme or point o f the narrative. Narratives organize 
events into wholes that have beginnings, middles, 
and ends." The Canadian feminist musician Ferron 
tells a story about being told that a song, to be a 
ballad, needs events, that happen in order. "How 
many o f your events happen in order?" she asks her 
audience. "Usually, they a l l happen at once." 
I wish I could tell us all how to talk about 
our events as i f they all happened at once. I wish I 
could say what would happen i f we stopped buying 
into the fictions o f subjectivity which dominate 
current writing and thinking. But I feel sure that i f 
we don't pay attention to the ways we can tell our 
stories differently, i f we don't try to uncover the 
effects o f the theory o f the subject and the theory o f 
language which underly both the organizing work 
we do and the ways we talk about it, then we cannot 
create fundamental change. We can make 
individual lives more bearable, we can change some 
o f the legal and institutional structures which 
organize women's lives, but we leave even our 
successes open to recapture by the dominant. This 
means that constant vigilance is required to 
maintain the gains we have achieved. Since the 
work we do as organizers and researchers is already 
difficult enough, it is my hope that by recognizing 
and challenging the theoretical underpinnings o f 
what we do, we can bring about real and lasting 
transformation. 
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